French Anti-avoidance Rules (CFC & Low‑tax Jurisdictions) in 2026: What Multinationals, Funds and In‑house Teams Must Do

The French controlled foreign company (CFC) rules require a distinction between the conditions bringing an arrangement within the regime and the safeguards that may exclude taxation. Economic substance matters principally to the latter analysis: it can support the application of the safeguard clauses in Articles 209 B and 123 bis of the Code general des impots (CGI). For foreign holding companies, substance also has separate implications for the location of effective management and access to tax treaty benefits. Those questions must be examined under their own rules. The June and July 2026 developments concerning entity classification and participation exemptions further show why CFC exposure cannot be reduced to a general assessment of substance.

The practical starting point is a legal analysis of each entity and shareholder, supported by contemporaneous evidence. Test the statutory scope, identify the applicable safeguard, and calculate any attributable income only if taxation remains applicable. Review effective management, treaty entitlement and transfer pricing separately.

Executive summary: recent developments and immediate takeaways

The 2026 developments address distinct parts of the CFC analysis. The decision of 6 July 2026 concerns foreign entities assimilable to French Article 8 entities. Level One, decided on 30 June 2026, requires the French tax comparison for a holding to account for the QPFC and expenses deductible under French rules: the resulting French tax may be zero, or positive for a holding with no expenses. The BOFiP update of 10 June 2026 separately clarifies the Article 209 B comparison. These issues concern statutory scope, before reliance on a safeguard. [1]-[3]

Article 209 B concerns French entities subject to corporation tax that exploit a foreign enterprise or hold the required participation in a foreign entity subject to a privileged tax regime. Article 123 bis concerns French-resident individuals holding, in principle, at least 10% of a qualifying foreign entity whose assets are predominantly financial. Limited substance is not a separate statutory condition triggering either regime. Where the scope conditions are met, the respective safeguard clauses must then be examined. [4, 5]

• Map the statutory conditions. Identify the taxpayer, foreign entity classification, applicable participation threshold, income and asset profile, and foreign-to-French tax comparison.
• Document the applicable safeguard. Retain evidence of the arrangement’s commercial purposes and effects, actual activity and governance. Relate each item of evidence to the statutory test being relied on.
• Review the other tax questions. Check where effective management is exercised, whether treaty conditions are satisfied, and whether transfer pricing reflects actual functions. A conclusion on one issue does not determine the others.
• Set priorities from the legal assessment. Identify any open-year exposure before deciding whether governance changes, restructuring, a ruling request or corrective filings are appropriate.

Quick primer: France’s anti‑avoidance framework and CFC mechanics

France’s anti-avoidance framework contains several distinct mechanisms. Articles 209 B and 123 bis attribute specified foreign profits or income to a French taxpayer when their conditions are met and no safeguard excludes taxation. Effective management and territoriality rules concern the foreign company’s own French tax exposure. Transfer pricing, treaty anti-abuse rules and domestic abuse-of-law provisions address other questions. The same facts can be relevant to several mechanisms, but each has its own legal basis and consequences.

Statutory framework and administrative guidance

The CGI supplies the charging conditions and safeguards; BOFiP sets out the administration’s interpretation. France’s corporate CFC regime also sits within the EU framework established by the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive. For a particular entity, the operative analysis must nevertheless begin with the relevant French provisions and their version applicable to the years concerned.

First establish the statutory scope of the CFC regime

Under Article 209 B, examine the exploitation of a foreign enterprise or the required participation in a foreign entity, generally more than 50%, subject to the specific statutory aggregation rules. Under Article 123 bis, examine the individual’s qualifying participation and the predominantly financial nature of the foreign entity’s assets, after determining its classification under French law. The privileged-tax-regime test compares the tax actually borne abroad with the tax on the same income under ordinary French rules, including applicable exemptions. Article 238 A generally sets the threshold at foreign tax at least 40% below the French benchmark. None of those conditions is replaced by an assessment of staffing or premises. [3]-[5]

Where those scope conditions are satisfied, substance becomes relevant principally as evidence supporting the applicable safeguard clause. The legal question is whether the statutory exclusion is available, rather than whether an entity passes a universal minimum-substance test. The applicable test differs between Article 209 B and Article 123 bis and according to the jurisdiction involved. [4, 5]

Then assess the applicable safeguard clause

Article 209 B II and III

For an EU entity, paragraph II excludes attribution where the exploitation or holding does not constitute an artificial arrangement aimed at circumventing French tax legislation. Outside that case, paragraph III places on the French corporate taxpayer the task of showing that the operations principally have a purpose and effect other than locating profits in a privileged tax regime. The condition is deemed satisfied notably where the entity principally carries on an effective industrial or commercial activity in the jurisdiction. That is a statutory route to the safeguard, rather than a requirement imposed on every holding. [5]

Article 123 bis paragraph 4 bis

The first limb concerns EU entities and qualifying non-EU jurisdictions with the required administrative-assistance and recovery-assistance agreements and without non-cooperative status. It excludes attribution where the exploitation or holding does not constitute an artificial arrangement aimed at circumventing French tax law. Under the second limb, for other jurisdictions, the individual must show a principal purpose and effect other than locating profits or income in a privileged tax regime. [4]

Substance and commercial-purpose evidence should address the applicable limb. For a holding, governance, the actual exercise of authority, resources appropriate to its functions and the reasons for the investment structure require contextual assessment. There is no uniform headcount or premises threshold in these safeguard provisions, and evidence of activity is not a substitute for examining their precise wording.

Transfer pricing remains a separate analysis

Transfer pricing and CFC safeguards may draw on overlapping evidence, including the identity and authority of decision-makers, functions performed, assets used and risks controlled. Their purposes differ. Transfer pricing determines arm’s-length remuneration between associated enterprises; a CFC safeguard may exclude attribution where its own statutory conditions are satisfied. Evidence sufficient for one question may be insufficient for the other.

A transfer pricing policy should therefore be consistent with the facts relied on for a safeguard, but compliance with that policy does not automatically exclude CFC taxation. Conversely, limited functions do not dispense with the need to establish the CFC scope conditions and examine the available safeguard.

Recent decisions and administrative guidance on foreign holdings

The following developments concern the statutory scope and French tax benchmark. They should be distinguished from the safeguard analysis. A holding company may fall outside CFC taxation because a scope condition is absent, without having to establish a safeguard based on its activity or commercial rationale.

Article 123 bis and foreign partnerships on 6 July 2026

In decision no. 501276 of 6 July 2026, the Conseil d’Etat held that Article 123 bis does not apply to profits of a foreign company assimilable to an entity governed by Article 8 CGI. The French-resident individual is instead taxable directly on their share under the rules corresponding to the entity’s activity. The case concerned Luxembourg single-member limited liability companies assimilable to French EURLs with an individual shareholder. The court applied the method of first examining the foreign company’s legal characteristics and governing law, then determining its French tax treatment. [1]

This is a question of the applicable charging provision, rather than a general exemption. A foreign corporate tax treatment does not dispense with the French assimilation exercise. Practitioners should document that exercise before testing Article 123 bis or calculating deemed investment income. [1]

Article 123 bis and the French tax benchmark on 30 June 2026

In Level One (Conseil d’Etat, 30 June 2026, no. 496618), the relevant comparison is between the foreign holding’s actual tax burden and the tax it would have borne as a French-resident holding. The French calculation must include both the parent-subsidiary exemption and the expense add-back (quote-part de frais et charges, or QPFC), together with expenses actually incurred that would have been deductible under French rules. [2]

Where those deductible expenses equal or exceed the QPFC and the holding’s income consists exclusively of qualifying participation dividends, its hypothetical French tax is nil. That was the outcome in Level One: the foreign holding could not be treated as enjoying a privileged tax regime, so Article 123 bis could not apply. This conclusion arises from the tax comparison, before any safeguard is needed. [2]

Conversely, for a pure holding with fully exempt dividends abroad and no deductible expenses, the QPFC leaves a positive French tax charge. That difference can establish the privileged-tax-regime condition and lead to Article 123 bis taxation if its other conditions are met and the paragraph 4 bis safeguard does not apply. [2, 4]

Illustration using a 5% QPFC and a 25% corporation tax rate: EUR 1 million of qualifying dividends gives a EUR 50,000 add-back. With EUR 60,000 of deductible expenses and no other income, French tax is zero. With no expenses, French tax is EUR 12,500, equivalent to 1.25% of the gross dividends. If foreign tax is zero, this second case creates the tax differential; it does not dispense with checking the safeguard.

The parent-subsidiary regime’s conditions and the French deductibility of the expenses must be substantiated. Level One also allows the administration to challenge reliance on that regime under the general principle prohibiting fraud on the law where its requirements are established; that argument failed on the facts of the case. [2]

Why the approach merits criticism

Although Level One resulted in relief for the taxpayers, the approach it establishes is open to serious criticism. A foreign participation exemption may qualify as a privileged tax regime solely because the foreign system has no equivalent to the French QPFC. The outcome can then turn on whether the holding incurs sufficient deductible expenses to absorb that French add-back. Otherwise comparable holdings can therefore face different Article 123 bis outcomes because of their cost structure, without that difference itself establishing tax avoidance.

The principal EU-law criticism concerns the coherence of the participation exemption itself. For qualifying intra-EU distributions under the exemption method, the parent-subsidiary framework is designed to eliminate economic double taxation of the profits distributed to the parent. Its separate rule on participation expenses permits a correction of deductible costs associated with exempt income, including a fixed amount within the prescribed limit. [10]

On that analysis, the QPFC should be understood as a technical correction preventing the combination of exempt dividends and deduction of the associated expenses, rather than as taxation of the dividends themselves. Treating the absence of a corresponding foreign add-back as evidence of a privileged dividend-tax regime appears difficult to reconcile with the underlying exemption: the foreign holding may simply benefit from the same principle of exemption, implemented through a different treatment of expenses. This is the conceptual objection to using the QPFC differential to bring otherwise ordinary holdings within Article 123 bis.

That objection challenges the Conseil d’Etat’s express characterisation. Following its AXA decision of 5 July 2022, the court regards the excess of the fixed QPFC over actual expenses as taxation of part of the dividends; Level One applies that reasoning to the French tax benchmark. The criticism advanced here is that this approach changes the role of an expense-deduction correction and risks undermining the recognition of equivalent foreign participation exemptions. It should be distinguished from the rule currently applied by the court. [2, 11]

The legal challenge nevertheless requires care. The directive expressly permits a fixed expense amount of up to 5% of distributions; it does not require that amount always to match actual expenses. Moreover, the parent-subsidiary directive governs qualifying distributions to corporate parents, whereas Article 123 bis attributes income to individuals. The objection is therefore one of consistency with the exemption framework and its purpose; it does not, without further analysis, establish a direct breach of the directive. [4, 10]

The approach also risks extending Article 123 bis beyond its legislative purpose of countering fraud and tax evasion, recalled by the Conseil d’Etat on 6 July 2026. Its practical reach can encompass ordinary holdings in OECD countries operating conventional participation exemptions, including holdings with little or no deductible expenditure. OECD membership does not itself prevent the privileged-tax classification, but neither does the use of an ordinary foreign participation exemption demonstrate an avoidance arrangement. The concern is that a rule directed against evasion may expose a broad class of conventional investment structures to a safeguard analysis merely because of a difference in the treatment of the QPFC. [1, 2]

Article 209 B and the BOFiP update of 10 June 2026

Paragraph 120 of BOI-IS-BASE-60-10-20-20, updated on 10 June 2026, clarifies the comparison for foreign holding companies. French law exempts qualifying participation gains and dividends subject to expense add-backs of 12% and 5%, respectively, or 1% for certain dividends. A foreign regime providing an equivalent exemption does not, by itself, constitute a privileged tax regime for Article 209 B, even without a corresponding expense add-back. The absence of that add-back alone is therefore insufficient to trigger the corporate CFC regime. [3]

This administrative position concerns Article 209 B and should be distinguished from the QPFC-and-expenses comparison under Article 123 bis in Level One. In particular, the BOFiP statement that an equivalent foreign participation exemption does not, by itself, create a privileged regime even without a foreign add-back should not be presented as erasing the Article 123 bis exposure of every holding with no expenses. Check the relevant regime, the income concerned and the applicable safeguards separately. [2, 3]

A welcome extension of the BOFiP position to Article 123 bis

We hope that the administration will extend to Article 123 bis the position published on 10 June 2026 for Article 209 B: an equivalent foreign participation exemption should not, by itself, constitute a privileged tax regime merely because it entails no expense add-back. Such an extension would largely neutralise the practical reach of the highly questionable QPFC-based comparison in Level One for holdings benefiting from equivalent foreign exemptions. It would bring welcome consistency between the two CFC regimes and refocus the analysis on arrangements warranting the anti-avoidance rules. This is a desired development; the cited guidance currently addresses Article 209 B, not Article 123 bis. [3]

Practical implications for foreign holding companies

Record separately why the entity falls outside the statutory scope, if applicable, and why a safeguard would exclude taxation if those scope conditions were met. Preserve the participation-exemption analysis, relevant expenses and commercial purposes. Separately assess effective management and treaty entitlement. This sequence avoids treating all objections to CFC attribution as a single substance defence.

The distinct roles of substance for foreign holdings

Supporting a CFC safeguard

Within the CFC analysis, substance principally helps substantiate the absence of an artificial arrangement or the commercial purpose and effect required by the relevant safeguard. Its evidential significance follows the clause relied on and the holding’s actual functions. A company outside the statutory scope does not need a safeguard to defeat CFC attribution.

Establishing where effective management is exercised

Actual foreign governance can reduce the risk that France treats the company’s place of effective management as located in France. The focus is on where the persons exercising the highest functions actually take the strategic decisions for the business as a whole. Local incorporation and formal board meetings alone may be insufficient where decisions are in fact made from France. In its decision of 27 March 2020, no. 421627, the Conseil d’Etat upheld a French-residence finding under the France-Switzerland treaty based on the management and strategic decisions exercised from France. [6]

This is a separate issue from CFC attribution to a French shareholder. A French effective-management finding can expose the foreign company itself to French taxation, subject to domestic territoriality rules and the applicable treaty. Its precise consequences, including any dual-residence resolution, depend on those rules; it does not automatically mean that every foreign-source profit is taxable in France. [7, 8]

Supporting entitlement to treaty benefits

Substance may also support a claim to tax treaty benefits, for example a reduced withholding-tax rate on dividends or interest. Actual governance, control over the income and commercial reasons for the structure can be relevant to treaty residence, beneficial ownership where required, and applicable anti-abuse provisions. These are distinct conditions: substance is neither a universal standalone treaty requirement nor a guarantee of relief.

Check the particular treaty and any applicable Multilateral Instrument modifications. Where the principal purpose test applies, relief may be denied if obtaining the benefit was one of the principal purposes of an arrangement, unless granting it accords with the object and purpose of the relevant provisions. Evidence of real functions and commercial rationale may assist, but each treaty condition still needs to be met. A reduced dividend or interest withholding rate therefore cannot be assumed from the presence of local directors or premises alone. [9]

CFC rules and other grounds for French taxation

The table compares CFC attribution with other grounds on which French taxation or denial of a tax benefit may arise. A foreign holding may need to address more than one ground; a successful safeguard argument does not settle its effective management, transfer pricing or treaty position.

How to use the comparison

Begin with the legal basis advanced by the administration. For a CFC claim, test scope and the applicable safeguard. For a claim based on effective management in France, examine where strategic decisions are actually made and the domestic and treaty consequences. For treaty relief, examine the particular convention, its applicable amendments and the conditions attached to the claimed benefit.

France tax anti-avoidance compliance: checklist & timeline for multinationals and funds

An effective compliance review follows the legal sequence: scope, safeguard and, where necessary, attribution. The evidence file should also address the distinct residence, treaty and transfer pricing issues relevant to the entity. The following timetable is an organisational recommendation, rather than a statutory period.

Immediate actions (0–3 months): entity map, risk scoring, documentation review, board notices

1. Map the entities and shareholders. Record legal form, residence, ownership rights, asset composition, income categories and the applicable participation thresholds.
2. Assess scope before assigning risk. Reconstruct the French benchmark, including participation exemptions. Where the scope conditions are met, identify the specific safeguard and the evidence supporting it.
3. Review the evidence. Collect commercial-purpose memoranda, board papers, delegated authorities, service agreements and proof of actual activity. Identify separately any weaknesses in the safeguard, effective-management or treaty analysis.
4. Brief the board. Explain the relevant legal grounds, potential exposure and evidential gaps, together with any proposed corrective action.
5. Review proposed transactions. Before adding new flows or entities, assess whether they change the CFC scope, safeguard, residence or treaty conclusions.

Short-term remediation (3–12 months): restructuring, TP adjustments, disclosures, rulings

1. Improve governance where the facts justify it. Ensure that persons responsible for the holding’s decisions have the competence, information and authority to make them. Evidence should reflect actual conduct; additional employees or rented premises alone do not establish a safeguard.
2. Consider restructuring where a material exposure remains. Compare the consequences of retaining, simplifying or relocating an entity only after analysing the applicable rules. Limited staffing alone is not a sufficient basis for recommending liquidation.
3. Review transfer pricing independently. Match intercompany remuneration to actual functions and risks, while maintaining consistency with the safeguard and effective-management files.
4. Consider corrective filings where the legal review identifies underdeclared income. Assess the applicable years, procedure, interest and penalties before proceeding.
5. Consider an advance ruling. Where the position is genuinely uncertain, a pre‑filing approach (rescrit) to the administration can provide certainty, subject to the caveats below.

Ongoing review of safeguards governance and reporting

1. Maintain the safeguard evidence. Update the commercial rationale and records of actual activity; preserve evidence explaining how governance and resources support the entity’s functions.
2. Preserve contemporaneous contracts. Ensure intercompany agreements reflect actual conduct and are dated when the arrangements were put in place.
3. Keep the transfer pricing documentation current. Update local and master files annually; stale documentation undermines credibility.
4. Retain records for the full assessment window. The standard reassessment period applies, and can be extended in cases of fraud or where undisclosed foreign structures are involved, so retention policy must account for the longer tail.
5. Maintain a separate conclusion for each issue. The file should explain the CFC scope, any safeguard relied on, effective management, relevant treaty benefits and transfer pricing.

Fund-specific issues: carried interest, holding vehicles, and investor reporting

Fund structures may contain foreign holdings, management companies and other vehicles with different functions. Analyse the relevant taxpayer and each entity separately. A passive income profile or limited staff does not itself establish CFC liability, while real foreign activity may be relevant to a safeguard and to other tax questions.

Common fund structures at risk (LP/GP, Manco, blocker entities)

Distinguish the management company, holding vehicles and blockers. For each, determine whether the CFC scope conditions are met and which safeguard may apply. For a holding, examine its governance and commercial role in the investment chain. For a management company, also examine where services and investment decisions are performed. Avoid applying the same staffing expectations to entities with different functions.

Carried interest and profit allocation: CFC implications

Carried interest and fund profit allocations require analysis of the recipient, the nature of the income and the applicable domestic and treaty rules. French-based decision-making may raise residence, remuneration, establishment or transfer pricing issues. CFC exposure nevertheless requires its own participation, entity and tax conditions to be satisfied, followed by consideration of the relevant safeguard. The location of the investment team alone does not resolve that analysis.

Practical mitigations and disclosure templates

• Document actual management. Record who decides, where they do so and what authority they exercise. Distinguish shareholder oversight from decisions taken for the foreign company itself.
• Review the holding chain. Identify the commercial, regulatory, financing or investor functions of each entity and assess the relevant tax conditions before recommending simplification.
• Document the commercial rationale for blockers. Where a blocker serves a genuine regulatory or investor need, record that need contemporaneously.

Use reporting that states the relevant facts and legal conclusion. A safeguard explanation should identify the clause relied on, the commercial purposes and effects, and the supporting activity and governance evidence. A treaty explanation should separately address residence, beneficial ownership where required and anti-abuse conditions. Statements about substance should be specific and supportable.

How to respond to a DGFiP audit alleging CFC/anti‑avoidance

An audit response should distinguish the grounds asserted. CFC attribution, French effective management, transfer pricing and denial of treaty relief call for different legal arguments even where they draw on some of the same documents.

Step-by-step audit playbook and timelines

1. On receipt of the opening notice: confirm the years and entities in scope, calendar every deadline, and assemble the response team (in‑house tax, external adviser, finance).
2. When documents are requested, provide an organised file linking each item to the issue it supports: statutory scope, safeguard, effective management, treaty entitlement or transfer pricing. Observe the applicable procedural requirements and response deadlines.
3. Build the CFC defence in sequence: challenge any unsatisfied scope condition; identify the applicable safeguard and its supporting evidence; then address any disputed calculation. For holdings, include the 2026 classification and participation-exemption authorities. Present any separate residence or treaty defence under its own legal test.
4. Engage with proposed adjustments: respond in writing within the applicable statutory response period following a proposed reassessment (proposition de rectification), rebut each point with evidence, and preserve every argument for potential later litigation.
5. Escalate where needed: use the available administrative recourse, including hierarchical review and, where relevant, the competent commission, before any contentious phase.

When to litigate vs settle

The decision to litigate or seek a settlement should reflect the legal merits, factual record, amount at stake and available procedures. A strong classification or tax-comparison argument may defeat a CFC assessment independently of staffing. Where reliance is placed on a safeguard, assess the evidence against that clause. Limited substance alone is not a sufficient reason to concede a CFC adjustment.

Building evidence for safeguards and related tax questions

The same documents can serve different purposes, but the analysis should explain the connection. Board papers may support the absence of an artificial arrangement for a CFC safeguard and help establish where effective management occurs. Cash-flow and financing records may assist a beneficial-ownership analysis. Functional evidence may support transfer pricing. None of those conclusions should be inferred automatically from another.

Records to retain and the questions they address

• Board papers and minutes showing the information considered, the persons exercising authority, actual deliberation and the location of decisions.
• Records identifying directors, employees and service providers, their competence, responsibilities and actual work for the entity.
• Premises, systems and service arrangements relevant to the functions actually performed. A holding’s resources should be assessed in light of its activities rather than against an operating-company checklist.
• Commercial agreements, investment and financing records, and cash-flow evidence that reflect actual conduct and the reasons for the structure.
• Correspondence, approvals and delegated authorities showing how governance works in practice, together with the residence and treaty documents relevant to the claimed relief.

How transfer pricing policies interact with CFC assessments

Keep the transfer pricing analysis consistent with actual functions and with the evidence used for safeguards and effective management. The tests remain distinct: arm’s-length remuneration does not establish treaty entitlement or automatically secure a CFC safeguard. Likewise, improving a safeguard file does not correct inappropriate intercompany pricing.

Practical examples and decision flowcharts

These examples separate the CFC scope and safeguard questions from effective management and treaty entitlement. The analysis must identify the taxpayer, relevant entity and applicable years before drawing a conclusion.

• Example A, non-EU holding. A French corporate taxpayer controls a holding outside the EU that receives dividends and interest. First test Article 209 B I and reconstruct the French benchmark, including qualifying participation income. If the scope conditions are met, examine Article 209 B III and the evidence concerning the principal purpose and effect of the operations. Limited staffing may affect that evidence, but does not itself trigger attribution. [3, 5]
• Example B, EU holding. A holding in an EU Member State receives participation income and has a local board. First examine whether the foreign exemption means the privileged-tax condition is absent. If that condition and the other scope requirements are met, assess the Article 209 B II safeguard concerning an artificial arrangement. Separately verify where the board actually exercises authority and whether the conditions for any claimed treaty relief are met. [3, 5]
• Example C, individual shareholder. A French-resident individual owns a foreign holding. Begin with classification under French law, the participation and financial-asset conditions, and the tax comparison. If Article 123 bis is within scope, apply the relevant limb of paragraph 4 bis according to the jurisdiction’s EU status, assistance agreements and non-cooperative status. The safeguard evidence should address that limb, while effective management and any treaty benefits require separate analysis. [1, 4]

The CFC decision sequence is: identify and classify the entity; test the scope conditions; assess the applicable safeguard; then calculate any attributable income. In parallel, assess whether the company’s management or activities create direct French tax exposure and whether treaty relief is available.

Next steps for foreign holdings

Review foreign holdings through separate but coordinated analyses. Establish the statutory CFC scope, then document any safeguard relied on. Confirm that effective management corresponds to the facts and examine the conditions for treaty benefits on each relevant income flow. The June and July 2026 authorities should be included in the classification and French-tax-benchmark analysis. This approach gives substance its proper role without treating it as a universal test for French taxation. For tailored advice, contact the International Tax, France team through the Global Law Experts network and the directory of International Tax lawyers in France.

Need Legal Advice?

This article was produced by Global Law Experts. For specialist advice on this topic, contact Nicolas Duboille at Sumerson, a member of the Global Law Experts network.

Sources

1. [1] Conseil d Etat 6 July 2026 no 501276 – Official source
2. [2] Conseil d Etat 30 June 2026 no 496618 – Official source
3. [3] BOI IS BASE 60 10 20 20 paragraph 120 updated 10 June 2026 – Official source
4. [4] Code general des impots Article 123 bis – Official source
5. [5] Code general des impots Article 209 B – Official source
6. [6] Conseil d Etat 27 March 2020 no 421627 – Official source
7. [7] BOI IS CHAMP 60 10 20 on effective management and territoriality – Official source
8. [8] OECD guidance on treaty residence of entities paragraphs 32 to 35 – Official source
9. [9] OECD MLI guidance on synthesised texts Article 7 principal purpose test – Official source

[10] Parent Subsidiary Directive 2011 96 EU Article 4 paragraphs 1 and 3 – Official source

[11] Conseil d Etat 5 July 2022 AXA no 463021 – Official source

1. Legifrance, Code général des impôts (CGI) and Livre des procédures fiscales
2. BOFiP, Bulletin Officiel des Finances Publiques (Impôts)
3. Conseil d’État, jurisprudence
4. OECD, BEPS guidance on CFCs and transfer pricing
5. European Commission, Taxation and Customs Union (Anti‑Tax Avoidance Directive)
6. Conseil National des Barreaux (CNB)